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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACy-CONSENSUAL
SODOMY AND THE CHOICE OF A MORAL DOCTRINE: NEW YORK'S
PERMISSIVE POSITION-People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d
936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ronald Onofre admitted to committing acts of deviate sexual
intercourse in his home with a seventeen-year-old male. Onofre was
convicted in the County Court of Onondaga County, New York, of
violating the state's criminal statute prohibiting consensual sodomy.)
The decision was reversed by the appellate division, and the indict
ment against Onofre was dismissed on the grounds that the statute
interfered with his constitutionally protected right of privacy and
that it denied him equal protection of the law. 2 The Onondaga
County District Attorney appealed to the New York Court of Ap
peals, where People v. Onofre 3 was argued.
This note examines the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Onofre. Analysis focuses on the due process and equal protection
arguments utilized by the court in its invalidation of the New York
statute prohibiting consensual sodomy among unmarried adults in
private, noncommercial settings. 4
1. "A person is guilty of consensual sodomy when he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975). Deviate
sexual intercourse is defined as "sexual conduct between persons not married to each
other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the
mouth and the vulva." Id § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1975).
2. People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), affd,
51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
3. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerro denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981).
4. This note deals with the right of privacy derived by the Supreme Court of the
United States from the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 949. A right of privacy has been derived from other areas of the Constitu
tion. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX. A right of privacy has also been derived
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Onofre is unique in a number of aspects. First, the case in
volved unmarried heterosexual and unmarried homosexual defend
ants. Thus, the opinion touched upon the fundamental right of
privacy and the legislation of morality through issues which gener
ally have been treated in separate discussions. s Next, the majority
has illuminated a plausible interpretation of various Supreme Court
decisions, ignored by some jurisdictions, which extends the funda
mental right of privacy to private, consensual sexual acts between
unmarried adults. 6 Finally, the majority and dissenting opinions re
flect the deep philosophical differences underlying arguments for
and against the extension of a fundamental right of privacy and ar
guments for and against judicial deference to legislative pronounce
ment of morality in the area of consensual sodomy.7
from the penumbras of these amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).
5. Most criminal prosecutions involve only homosexual or heterosexual defendants
rather than a combination of the two. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge ct.), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (state
sodomy statute constitutional as applied to homosexual defendants); State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (state sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to acts of con
sensual sodomy performed in private by adults of the opposite sex).
Scholarly articles that analyze sodomy statutes in terms of homosexual and hetero
sexual behavior do so in separate discussions and have not addressed or envisioned the
situation in Onofre, where homosexual and heterosexual behavior were addressed within
the same case. See, e.g., Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life
styles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Stat
utes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976).
The area of homosexual rights is vast. Discussion in this note focuses on the homo
sexual's right to engage in private, consensual sodomitical acts without commercial as
pects and without involvement of minors. (The statutory age of consent in New York is
seventeen years). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3}(a} (McKinney 1975). It is not unreasona
ble to assume that such sexual relations provide a foundation for homosexual relation
ships and that extension of sexual freedom to the homosexual could be viewed as
legitimizing the existence of homosexuals and their behavior. See infra text accompany
ing notes 138-40. The concept of sexual privacy, however, is only one aspect of the law in
the area of homosexuality. A court's invalidation of a consensual sodomy statute may
well permit the homosexual to engage in acts of sodomy within the privacy of the home,
yet such judicial action does not necessarily allow the homosexual to marry a member of
the same sex, to teach in a public school, or to receive government benefits. See Karst,
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.l. 624, 628 (1980). Simply, there is a
great deal more to human relationships than sexual activities. Invalidation or repeal of a
consensual sodomy statute affects the sexual aspect of intimate homosexual and hetero
sexual relationships. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
other aspects of intimate homosexual and heterosexual relationships, and the degree to
which they are subject to government interference, see generally Karst, supra note 3.
6. For a discussion of Supreme Court language lending itself to this interpretation,
see infra text accompanying notes 36, 41-46.
7. For a discussion of the moral values underlying the divergent majority and mi
nority positions in Onofre, see infra text accompanying notes 104-41.
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This case note examines each of these three areas and concludes
that the Supreme Court of the United States must take a definitive
stance on the issue of homosexuality before the law related to the
rights of all unmarried individuals engaging in acts of private, con
sensual sodomy can be settled.
II.
A.

ONOFRE

Facts

Onofre was heard with two companion cases. Defendants
Conde Peoples, III, and Philip Goss were convicted in Buffalo City
Court of violating penal law section 130.38. 8 A jury determined
from the evidence that the two had engaged in an act of oral sodomy
in an automobile parked on a street in the city of Buffalo during the
early morning hours.9 This conviction was affirmed in the County
Court of Erie County. The claim that the statute was unconstitu
tional because it infringed on the right of privacy and was a denial of
equal protection of the laws was rejected. lO
Defendant Mary Sweat was convicted of the same crime after a
jury trial in Buffalo City Court on proof that she had committed an
act of oral sodomy with a male in a truck parked on a street in a
residential area of the city during the early morning hours. I I Her
appeal to the County Court of Erie County, based on a claim similar
to that of defendants Peoples and Goss, was rejected. 12
The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal
in all three cases. 13 They were argued together in Onofre 14 and
presented the common question of whether the provision of the New
York Penal Code making consensual sodomy a crime infringed upon
defendants' constitutionally protected rights. The court of appeals
affirmed the reversal of Onofre's conviction and reversed the convic
tions of defendants Peoples, Goss, and Sweat. ls The majority con
8. 51 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
9. The fact that the act occurred in an automobile was of no legal consequence.
See infra note 16.
10. People v. Peoples & Goss, No. 483 (Erie County Ct., N.Y. Sept. 24, 1979), rev'd
sub nom., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
11. People v. Sweat, No. 3C12614 (Erie County Ct., N.Y. Sept. 24, 1979), rev'd sub
nom., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cerro
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
12. Id
13. 49 N.Y.2d 895, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1980).
14. 51 N.Y.2d at 483, 415 N.E.2d at 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
15. Id at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938,434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
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cluded that because the statute was broad enough to reach the
noncommercial, secluded sexual conduct of consenting adults, it vio
lated defendants' right of privacyl6 and right to equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the United States ConstitutionY
The United States Supreme Court allowed Onofre to stand
without comment. IS The Court denied a petition for writ of certio
rari review on May 18, 1981. 19
B. Analysis
1. Historical Origins of the Fundamental Right of Privacy
The New York Court of Appeals held that section 130.38 of the
New York Penal Code infringes on both homosexual and heterosex
16. Id at 485,415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949. The New York Court of
Appeals noted that both district attorneys claimed that the defendants' conduct drew the
admitted acts of sodomy into the classification of public rather than private sodomy,
which constituted a waiver of their right to assert a right of privacy. Id at 485 n.2, 415
N.E.2d at 938-39 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949 n.2. The court explained, however, that be
cause its disposition of the appeals also rested on the statute's violation of equal protec
tion rights, it need not pass on the Erie County District Attorney's contention that
because the acts of defendants occurred in vehicles parked on public streets, defendants
were barred from claiming the activities to be private acts. Id
The court also found the claim of the Onondaga County District Attorney that
Onofre's participation in the taking of photographs while engaging in acts of sodomy and
thereafter displaying such photographs to the district attorney rendered those acts public
in character to be without merit. Id Onofre was not barred from asserting a right of
privacy because the photographs were produced in response to specific criminal charges
of sexual abuse and sodomy in the first degree, as opposed to the purposeful or careless
display of such photographs to the public, as in Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.
Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
51 N.Y.2d at 485 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39 n.2, 434 N.Y.2d at 949 n.2.
The court of appeals' brief treatment of the location of the acts of sodomy by de
fendants Peoples, Goss and Sweat reveals that the actual basis of the court's decision
rests on equal protection analysis. This reduces the persuasiveness of the court's right of
privacy analysis. Nevertheless, this note proceeds, as did the New York Court of Ap
peals, on the assumption that the right of privacy analysis is applicable to the cases of all
defendants. Bul if. Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853,855 (8th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,423
U.S. 929 (1975) ("The 'right of privacy' rationale stressed by appellant has not been ex
tended by the Court to include the right to engage in the conduct for which appellant was
convicted here, namely, sodomy in a car parked on a public highway"); Carter v. State,
255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), eerl. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974) (act of sodomy at
II p.m. in car parked on a well lit lot of a public rest and tourist information center
adjacent to an interstate highway does not constitute private activity); Neville v. State,
290 Md. 364, 378-79, 430 A.2d 570, 577 (1981) (sodomy statute applicable where each
defendant engaged in consensual sodomy "during daylight hours in a place which. . .
was equally accessible to uninvited other persons as it was to petitioner").
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 949.
18. 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
19. Id
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ual defendants' fundamental right of privacy.2o This perhaps is the
most controversial and far-reaching aspect of Onofre .21 The origins
of this right to privacy are found in Griswold v. Connecticut,22 in
which the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut statute prohibiting
all persons from using contraceptives was unconstitutional because it
violated the fundamental right of privacy inherent in the marriage
relationship.23 The Court stated that any statute intruding on the
marital right of privacy would be strictly scrutinized and would be
sustained only in the absence of alternative means of achieving a
compelling state interest. 24
As a result of Griswold, many jurisdictions have ruled that crim
inal sanctions cannot be imposed on married couples for sodomitical
20. 51 N.Y.2d at 484-85, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49; see supra
note 4. The existence of a fundamental right determines the court's standard of review
under the due process and equal protection clauses. If a fundamental right is involved,
strict scrutiny is utilized under both a due process and an equal protection review of the
statute. It is said that "[w)hen an equal protection decision rests on this [fundamental
right) basis, it may be little more than a substantive due process decision decked out in
the trappings of equal protection." Note, The Conslilutionality ofLaws Forbidding Privale
Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1624 (1974) (quoting Developmenls in the
Law-Equal Prolection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1969»; see infra text accompany
ing notes 107-08 for a discussion of substantive due process. Under due process analysis
involving a fundamental right, a statute will be subject to strict scrutiny: it will be upheld
only if it is a necessary means toward accomplishing a compelling state interest. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Due process analysis is concerned with the relationship
between the means and ends of the statute while under equal protection analysis, atten
tion focuses on whether the statute disadvantages one group in comparison to another.
Developments in the Law-Equal Proleclion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1132 (1969). In
adding the fundamental interest theory to equal protection analysis, "a classification
might be found to be invalid even though it is not invidious and even though it is reason
ably related to a legitimate public purpose." Id. Under equal protection fundamental
right analysis, a court will weigh the benefit of the state's interest against the harm result
ing from the impairment of the personal interest. Id. "If the state's objective is not
important enough to justify impairment of the individual's interest, the classification will
fall. Here the focus is on the injustice created by unwarranted state interference with a
fundamental interest at least as strongly as on the injustice engendered by inequality."
Id. It should be noted that the Onofre court did not address the "suspect classification"
aspect of equal protection analysis, which involves scrutiny similar to fundamental rights
analysis. See infra note 85.
Fundamental rights for due process purposes include at least those rights that are
fundamental for equal protection purposes. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (due
process case citing equal protection cases holding that the right of privacy is fundamen
tal). If there is no fundamental right involved, then the due process and equal protection
analyses are separate inquiries at lesser levels of judicial scrutiny.
21. The Onofre majority actually decided the case on equal protection grounds.
See supra note 16.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 485-86.
24. Id. at 504.
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sexual conduct. 25 The current trend of case law indicates that anti
sodomy legislation no longer is applicable to married couples, re
gardless of whether the wording of the state statute has been changed
to accord with Griswold. 26
Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has attempted to specify
other areas of personal decisions in which the individual may choose
a course of action without unjustified government interference, while
also noting that "the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not
been marked by the Court. . . ."27 The areas specified by the
Supreme Court as within the sphere of protected private conduct are
personal decisions relating to marriage,28 procreation,29 contracep
tion,30 family relationships,3l childrearing and education,32 and
abortion. 33
It is out of these delineated areas that the debate surfaces as to
whether the right of personal privacy extends to all sexual activities
between consenting adults, or whether the protected areas symbolize
a narrower right of privacy that allows freedom to make personal
decisions concerning the bearing of children. 34 The divergent view
25. Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 382 n.17, 430 A.2d 570, 579 n.17 (1981) (holding
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982) constitutional as applied to defendants), cites nu
merous cases that have held or strongly implied that the general prohibition of a per
verted practices or oral sodomy statute cannot be applied to consenting married persons
acting with each other in private based on the constitutional right of privacy. See Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Doe v. Com
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620,625 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th
Cir.) (en bane), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I.
1980).
26. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.)
(en bane), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F .. Supp. 729
(N.D. Tex. 1970), vacaled and remanded sub nom., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989
(1971); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969).
27. Carey v. Population Services Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
29. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
32. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
34. The debate surfaces in recent cases. See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th
Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting),cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981) (commission of homos ex
ual act is not an impermissible ground for selective service prosecution under Article 125
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976»; Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80, cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 855
(1981) (upholding constitutionality of Navy regulation providing for the discharge of
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points can be traced to language in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 35 Eisenstadt
eliminated the distinction between married and unmarried couples
in the area of contraception. This holding has been interpreted as
extending the right of privacy to all sexual activities. 36
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an in
dependent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an associa
tion of two individuals. . .. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child. 37

A less expansive view of this language is that the right referred to in
Eisenstadt is simply the freedom to make decisions related to the
birth of a child. 38 Roe v. Wade 39 substantiated this narrow view. Roe
held that the right of privacy is a liberty guaranteed by the four
teenth amendment concept of personal liberty, thus entitling an un
married woman to terminate her pregnancy. 40
The Onofre majority adopted the more expansive interpretation
of the language in Eisenstadt. 41 The New York Court of Appeals
construed the Supreme Court decision in Roe as an extension of the
Eisenstadt definition ofprivacy.42 In combining the reasoning of the
those engaging in homosexual practices); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570
(1981) (Maryland perverted practices statutes MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982) con
stitutional as applied to defendants); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936,
434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980) cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58
(R.I. 1980) (right of privacy inapplicable to private, unnatural copulation between un
married adults).
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court in Eisensladl held that because "the distribu
tion of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on their distribu
tion to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible." Id at 453.
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Rumsfield, 647 F.2d 80, 85 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting),
cerl. denied; 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va.
1973), offd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Neville v.
State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 583 (1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting); People v.
Onofre, 51 N. Y .2d at 487, 415 N .E.2d at 940, 434 N. Y.S.2d at 950; see also Wilkinson &
White, supra note 5 at 589.
37. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
38. E.g., Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374, 430 A.2d 570, 575 (1981); People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 498,415 A.2d at 946,434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting);
State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 68 (R.I. 1980); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 574.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id at 153. For another narrow construction of Roe, see State v. Santos, 413
A.2d 58, 68 (R.1. 1980).
41. 51 N.Y.2d at 488,415 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
42. Id at 486-87, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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two cases, Onofre defined privacy as the freedom to make choices
about one's intimate affairs. 43 Justice Gabrielli's dissent in Onofre
acknowledged the fundamental right ofprivacy.44 In the spirit of the
Eisenstadt language,45 however, he contended that only marital inti
macy and procreative choice fall under such protection. 46
2.

Due Process

The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court47 limits the effect
of the court's decision to the State of New York,48 where the funda
mental right of privacy has been extended to an unmarried adult's
43. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 590. Yet the Court in Roe did not summa
rily equate privacy with autonomy: "[lIt is not clear to us that the claim. . . that one has
an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the
right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions." 410 U.S. at 154.
44. 51 N.Y.2d at 499, 415 N.E.2d at 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
45. See supra text accompanying note 37.
46. 51 N.Y.2d at 499, 415 N.E.2d at 947, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
47. 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
The sole significance of such a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari need not
be elucidated to those versed in the Court's procedures. It simply means that
fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision
of the lower court as a matter of sound judicial discretion. . . .
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912,917 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (citation omitted).
48. The privacy discussion in Onofre serves as mandatory authority only in the
State of New York, although Onofre has been noted in other jurisdictions. See Miller v.
Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 84 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) (adopting the majority view
in Onofre that private consensual homosexual activity is protected as an aspect of the
fundamental right of privacy), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting the Onofre decision yet upholding the consti
tutionality of a Navy regulation providing for the discharge of those engaging in homo
sexual practices), reh'g en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cerro denied, 454 U.S. 855
(1981).
Neville V. State, 290 Md. 364,430 A.2d 570 (1981), is particularly interesting as it
appears to be directly contrary to Onofre. The Neville majority held that where each
petitioner had engaged in intimate sexual activities during the daylight hours in a se
cluded place that was as accessible to uninvited persons as it was to petitioners, the
Maryland perverted practices statute was constitutionally applied. Id. at 381, 430 A.2d at
578. The majority found that MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1982), was not subject to an
equal protection attack as married persons as well as unmarried persons could be prose
cuted under the statute. Id. at 382, 430 A.2d at 579. The Neville dissent, however,
adopted the view of the Onofre majority and found that the acts of petitioners were
entitled to the constitutionally protected fundamental right of privacy. Id. at 391, 430
A.2d at 584 (Davidson, J., dissenting). Further, in a fashion similar to that of the Onofre
majority, the Neville dissent also found that the state does not have a compelling interest
in regulating private, consensual sexual activity among adults. Id. at 396, 430 A.2d at
586 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
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personal decisions related to sexual activity within the seclusion of
the home. 49 Onofre is significant in that the majority revived an ex
pansive view of the right of privacy that was ignored by the majority
of a three-judge district court and by the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.5o
. Doe involved Virginia's sodomy statute. 51 In Doe, a group of
male homosexuals sued in federal district court for declaratory and
injunctive relief. They argued that Virginia's sodomy statute was
unconstitutional as applied to consensual homosexual acts per
formed in private by adult males. 52 The Doe majority concluded
that state legislation regulating personal conduct was constitutionally
suspect only when it "trespass[ed] upon the privacy of the incidents
of marriage, upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of
family life."53 The majority quoted 54 dicta in a dissent from Poe v.
Ullman ,55 wherein Justice Harlan argued that private homosexuality
could be criminally prosecuted. 56 Doe acknowledged the right of
sexual privacy only in the area of decisions related to home, mar
riage, and family: a view consistent with the traditional view of Gris
wold and the narrow interpretation of Eisenstadt. 57 Doe serves as a
reminder that although a right to private sexual activity may exist,
49. See supra note 20 for a discussion on the scope of due process analysis. Despite
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals found that under due process section 130.38
violated constitutionally protected fundamental rights, the court's brief treatment of the
settings of defendants' acts of sodomy evidenced the court's intent to rest its holding on
equal protection grounds. See supra note 16, infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
50. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge ct.), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976). Onofre involved both homosexual and heterosexual behavior. Many federal
courts have understood the holding in Doe to be that homosexual conduct does not enjoy
special constitutional protection under the due process clause. Beller v. Middendorf, 632
F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted), rehg en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 S. Ct. 855 (1981).
51. VA. CODE § 18.2-36 (1982). The statute states in part:
CRIMES AGAINST NATURE-If any person shall carnally know in any manner
any brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or
by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she
shall be guilty of a . . . felony. . . .
Id
52. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
53. Id
54. Id at 1201-02.
55. 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Id More recently, however, at least one Justice has indicated that the constitu
tionally protected right to privacy may include private, consensual, sexual activities. "I
have serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulat
ing any sexual act between consenting adults." California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132
n.1O (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26, 38-40.
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this right must be balanced against "countervailing state interests."58
The Doe majority did not acknowledge the possible extension of the
fundamental right of privacy, evident in Eisenstadt and Roe,59 which
supports the freedom of the individual to make decisions about inti
mate personal matters.
The extension of the fundamental right of privacy, ignored by
Doe, was further evidenced in Stanley v. Georgia .60 Stanley is an
important factor in Onqfre because it expanded6J the scope of the
fundamental right of privacy beyond notions of the family related or
childbearing areas enumerated in Roe. 62 Stanley established the
home as a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, meaning one
was permitted to view sexual materials defined as obscene by the
community. This decision, in tum, allowed the Onqfre majority to
find that acts of sexual gratification within the home were constitu
tionally protected and that the consensual sodomy statute63 violated
defendants' fundamental right of privacy.64
58. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 599. This proposition is supported by the
Onofre dissent. 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43.
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding the right of an adult to possess and to view
obscene materials in the privacy of the home).
The Onofre dissent read Stanley to suggest that petitioner was protected only be
cause he exercised a constitutional right to receive information and ideas. 51 N.Y.2d at
501 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 948 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59 n.2 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
This view is also the majority view in Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374-75, 430 A.2d 570,
575 (1981). See supra note 48.
Yet the Onofre majority's emphasis on the special nature of the home suggested that
it was at least as much the setting as the nature of the activity that prompted the protec
tion. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 586 n.119. This view prevailed in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), in which the Supreme Court stated that "the
'privacy of the home' . . . was hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his
castle.''' Id at 66 (interpreting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564).
Thus, Stanley can be interpreted to stand for the proposition that the constitution
ally protected right to privacy includes intimacies occurring in private that are associated
with personal relationships. Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 390, 430 A.2d 570, 584 (1981)
(Davidson, J., dissenting). This view is in accord with the Onofre majority. But see
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 1980) (listing of federal cases holding
that homosexual activities are not constitutionally protected), reh'g en bane denied, 647
F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43.
62. 410 U.S. at 153.
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975).
64. This apparently assumes that there is, indeed, a fundamental right of privacy
that stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend
ment. Inherent in the Onofre majority's discussion of the right of privacy is the assump
tion that Supreme Court cases, including Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, are proper
interpretations of the "open-ended" due process and equal protection clauses of the four
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At least one authority believes that the majority m Doe "as
teenth amendment. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181 (1980) (acknowledging
that constitutional provisions are "open-ended"). But if., Bergcr, Ely's "Theory of Judi
cial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 120-21 (1981) (Berger claims that "[i]t is ... sheer
fantasy to maintain that the founders employed 'open-ended' terms in order to empower
judges to overrule the legislature or rewrite the Constitution by invoking values derived
outside the Constitution"). Id at 121. The Onofre dissent also assumes that the funda
mental right of privacy exists, although in a more limited sense. See supra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
This case note deals specifically with the choice between the Onofre majority and
dissenting theories regarding the right of privacy. This debate is also revealed in the
contrast between the Onofre and Doe majorities. It must be acknowledged, however,
that other constitutional questions concerning the fourteenth amendment's fundamental
right of privacy exist. One question inquires as to the nature ofjudicial adjudication; the
second question asks, assuming that the fundamental right of privacy is the business of
the courts, whether such a right be properly interpreted from the Constitution.
Debate on the first question centers on whether Supreme Court cases prior to
Onofre, proclaiming that a fundamental right of privacy can be derived from the four
teenth amendment, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 481; Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. at 443; and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164, are examples of proper judicial
adjudication.. What constitutes proper adjudication, however, varies according to the
particular doctrine of constitutional theory that is utilized. See generally Symposium: Ju
dicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
American constitutional theory has been marked by an ongoing effort to
reconcile two fundamental propositions about constitutional law, legislation,
and the judiciary in American society. The first proposition . . . the justifica
tion principle, asserts that there are occasions when judicial displacement of
legislative decisions-judicial review-is justified. The second proposition is
that judges cannot justifiably do whatever they want, but must respect some
constraints on their behavior as judges ... the restraint principle. Constitu
tional theory attempts to specify the constraints that judges must respect by
deriving them from the Constitution and the nature of democracy. It seeks to
constrain judges both directly, by the moral force it exerts on their work, and
indirectly, by providing an agreed-upon standard against which their work can
be measured.
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitu
tional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1037 (1980).
Tushnet's article is a critique of Ely's, Democracy and Distrust, which proposes that
judicial review under the Constitution's open-ended provisions be restricted to questions
of participation as opposed to questions dealing with the substantive merits of the polit
ical choice under attack. J. ELY, supra, at 181. This representation-reinforcing theory of
judicial review is an example of what Tushnet refers to as the restraint principle.
Tushnet,supra, at 1037. The popular characterization of the representation theory by the
Supreme Court was written by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980). For another major representation-reinforcing
theory, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)
(Supreme Court should not review federalism disputes between the states and the na
tional government; nor should it review separation of power disputes between Congress
and the executive branch).
Although the Choper and Ely theories differ, both share the common ground that
constitutional theory "should focus on function and process, in particular, on the broad
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concern whether nonjudicial institutions fairly represent diverse interests and, in those
cases in which they do not, on the special role of judicial review in securing that repre
sentation." Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Consti
tutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 319 (1981). Proponents of this theory would, as a
result, find that the right of privacy derived by the Supreme Court from the fourteenth
amendment is improper judicial adjudication, as the Court must avoid "controversial
judgments about substantive issues left open by the Constitution's text and history, and
[instead safeguard) the representative character of the political process." Tribe, supra, at
1063.
Tribe, however, in the spirit of Tushnet's justification principle, see Tushnet, supra
at 1037, contends that the representation-reinforcing theory of Ely "by itself determines
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented by a
full theory of substantive rights and values-the very sort of theory the process-perfecters
are at such pains to avoid." Tribe, supra, at 1064. Paul Brest is of a similar opinion and
questions Ely's proposition in Democracy and Distrust "that courts are more competent
to engage in representation-reinforcing judicial review, ... than in fundamental values,
which he [Ely) scorns." Brest, The Substance ofProcess, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 131 (1981)
(emphasis in original). Brest believes that "instances of representation-reinforcing de
mand value judgments not different in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort."
Id
While Tribe and Brest embrace a theory of judicial adjudication that seems to em
brace substantive rights and values similar to the right of privacy that has evolved from
the fourteenth amendment and is now at issue in Onofre, a question remains as to the
proper interpretation of those substantive rights and values from the Constitution. As
suming that the theory of judicial adjudication includes substantive values, the issue is
simply how the Constitution should be interpreted. The opposing theories are "interpre
tivism" and "noninterpretivism," each reflecting, respectively, the "longstanding debate
that pervades all oflaw, that between 'positivism' and 'natural law.' " J. ELY, supra, at I.
Ely sees noninterpretivism as the view "that judges deciding constitutional issues should
confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution." Id Interpretivism is seen as "the contrary view that courts should go
beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the
four comers of the document." Id
Paul Brest, although agreeing that the terms represent basically the same concept,
describes the contending theories as "originalism" (which can be divided into the subcat
egories "strict originalism" and "moderate originalism") and "nonoriginalism." Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204-05
(1980). Professor Brest explains the reasons for his differing terminology:
Virtually all modes of constitutional decisionmaking, including those endorsed
by Professor Ely, require interpretation. The differences lie in what is being
interpreted, and I use the term 'originalism' to describe the interpretation of text
and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of
precedents and social values.
Id at 204 n.!. According to originalism, then, it is possible to adopt a theory of judicial
adjudication that embraces substantive rights and values which at the same time dis
avows existence of a fundamental right of privacy derived from the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
By JUDICIARY 166-220 (1977). Berger contends that
[t)he Court, it is safe to say, has flouted the will of the framers and substituted
an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design [of the fourteenth
amendment): to leave suffrage, segregation, and other matters to State govern
ance. It has done this under [the) cover of the so-called 'majestic generalities' of
the Amendment-'due process' and 'equal protection'-which it found 'conve
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sumed away" an important, emerging constitutional question. 65
This question is whether, after Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley, there
exists a fundamental right to engage in private sexual practices
outside of the traditional marital and childbearing context. 66 The
Onofre majority addressed this question and answered it affirma
tively.67 The court of appeals, relying on Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stan
ley, adopted a trend in Supreme Court opinions protecting an
individual's right to make decisions concerning indulgence in private
acts of sexual intimacy and an individual's right to satisfy sexual
niently vague,' without taking into account the limited aims those terms were
meant to express.
Id at 408. This view is to be contrasted with that of a nonoriginalist, David A.J. Rich
ards, who argues that an examination of moral and philosophical theory can clarify the
fourteenth amendment's right of privacy. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional
Right 0/ Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1282-87 (1977).
In sum, the questions related to constitutional theory, i.e., the role of the judiciary in
adjudicating constitutional issues and the nature of constitutional interpretation, reveal
that the conflict between the majority and dissent in Onofre is only one aspect of the
multi-faceted debate related to the fundamental right of privacy. The preceding discus
sion reveals that there is not only a controversy as to which view of the right is correct,
exemplified by the debate in Onofre, but also a debate as to whether such a right exists,
and if it does, a debate as to whether the courts are the appropriate forum for the applica
tion or rejection of the fundamental right of privacy.
65. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 592.
66. Id
67. 51 N.Y.2d at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The precedential
significance of the summary affirmance of Doe by the Supreme Court is limited, inas
much as the Court gave no reasoning to explain exactly what it was affirming. "It is not
at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to give full consideration to a question
that has been the subject of previous summary action." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (citing Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes,
439 U.S. 463, 477 n.20 (1979». It should be noted that the lower court's decision does not
necessarily represent the reasoning of the Supreme Court. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432
U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975).
The Onofre dissent viewed the Doe affirmance as maintaining the state's right to
intervene in decisions involving pure sexual gratification. 51 N.Y.2d at 503, 415 N.E.2d
at 949, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The Onofre majority, however,
suggested that the disposition of the district court in Doe included no statement regard
ing the constitutionality of the statute and merely denied the relief requested and dis
missed the complaint. Id at 493,415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
[I]n Doe there was lacking any evidence of threatened prosecution . . .
under the Virginia statute-a factor arguably relevant to their standing to main
tain the action. . . . Thus, the affirmance by the Supreme Court of the District
Court's dismissal of the action may have been predicated on a lack of standing
on the part of the plaintiffs.
Id (citation omitted). This argument has not been accepted by jurisdictions that have
relied on Doe. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Hence, Doe establishes "the
proposition that state efforts to prohibit private, consensual homosexual conduct are con
stitutionally permissible, despite Stanley v. Georgia, Eisenstadt, and Roe." Wilkinson & ".
White, supra note 5, at 593.
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desires through the use of material condemned as obscene by com
mon standards. 68 The court of appeals labeled these rights "funda
mental";69 such a conclusion necessarily dictated that the statute be
upheld only if it was the sole means available to accomplish a com
pelling state purpose. 70
In subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny, a new debate arises.
Assuming that the right to indulge in acts of private, consensual sod
omy is encompassed by a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, the state must assert a compelling interest in prohibiting con
sensual sodomy between unmarried consenting adults in noncom
mercial settings, absent elements of force and involvement of
minors. Yet the Onofre majority found that the state was unable to
provide even a rational basis to justify its regulation of consensual
sodomy.71 The prosecution did not present any evidence that section
130.38 prevented physical harm to unmarried adults who engaged in
private, consensual acts of sodomy,72 or that any such harm was en
visioned by the state legislature when the state's penal law was
adopted. 73 The majority further contended that there was no show
ing by the state that interference in matters of intimate sexual behav
ior out of the public view would serve to advance the cause of public
morality.74 Nor did the prosecution reveal that section 130.38 pro
68. 51 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 41c5 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950-51. The court of
appeals expressed no view as to any theological, moral, or psychological evaluation of
consensual sodomy, nor was it unaware of the sensibilities of those who believe that
consensual sodomy is evil and should be unpunished. The court, however, saw the issue
in Onofre as whether the federal Constitution permits recourse to sanctions of criminal
law for the achievement of that objective. Id at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3.
69. 51 N.Y.2d at 486, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
70. Id; see Roe, 410 U.S. 113. This is another way of stating that the court must
use strict scrutiny in its review of the statute. See supra note 20.
71. 51 N.Y.2d at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951. Under its equal
protection analysis, the court noted that infringement upon defendants' fundamental
right of privacy would require that the statutory classification be necessary to the accom
plishment of a compelling state interest. Id at 492 n.6, 415 N.E.2d at 942 n.6, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 953 n.6. The court went on to state, however, that because the statute failed
to satisfy the lenient rational basis standard, there existed no need to measure the statute
by the strict scrutiny standard.
The court's inability to find a rational basis for the statute under equal protection
analysis suggests that the aforementioned logic is applicable to the due process portion of
the Onofre opinion. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. There is an argument,
however, that in refusing to defer to the legislative judgment under due process analysis,
the court actually was utilizing a form of heightened scrutiny. See infra text accompany
ing notes 93-104.
72. Id at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
73. Id at 489,415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
74. Id at 489-90,415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52.
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tected the institution of marriage, inasmuch as it was not suggested
that sodomy served as a substitute for marriage; or that empirical
data existed to indicate that marriage served as a refuge for those
deprived of the option of consensual sodomy outside of the marital
bond. 75 The court distinguished Onofre from another court of ap
peals case, People v. Shepard. 76 In Shepard, the court of appeals
held constitutional a statutory proscription of the use of marihuana
in the home where there was found to be a legitimate controversy,
over credible evidence, as to whether marihuana could be considered
a dangerous substance. 77 This finding justified the state legislature's
right to conclude that marihuana was a dangerous substance and,
accordingly, to impose a criminal proscription. 78 In Onofre, how
ever, the majority concluded that there was no evidence that the
practice of consensual sodomy was harmful either to the participants
or to society in general and found that the only argument made
against the statute was an appeal to the historical, conventional char
acterization of sodomy.79
The Onofre majority, utilizing due process analysis, found that
the right of an adult to engage in private, consensual acts of sodomy
was encompassed by the constitutionally protected fundamental
right of privacy. The court reasoned that simply because it would be
constitutionally permissible for the legislature to enter the privacy of
a person's home to regulate conduct arguably harmful to that per
son, the legislature was not entitled to invade this privacy in an effort
to regulate individual conduct where there was no evidence that the
75. Id at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
76. 50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840,431 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1980).
77. Defendant Shepard was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled sub
stance in the seventh degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 1980). Defendant
was in possession of nine marihuana plants. 50 N.Y.2d at 643, 409 N.E.2d at 841, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 364. These plants contained an aggregate weight ofless than nine-tenths of
one ounce of marihuana. Id at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting). This concentrated form of marihuana, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(5)
(McKinney 1980), was not encompassed by the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977. 1977
N.Y. Laws, ch. 360 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.00-.55 (McKinney 1980»; but
see 50 N.Y.2d at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
78. 50 N.Y.2d at 649, 409 N.E.2d at 845,431 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
79. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
[I)t is apparent that western civilization has through the centuries abhored tric)
sodomy, fellatio and cunnilingus. See Genesis 19:1-29; Deuteronomy 23:17,
Leviticus 18:22-23,20:16. As early as 1533 in the reign of Henry VIII, England
enacted statutes prohibiting sodomy which became a part of American common
law at the time of the American revolution.
State v. Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1,4,540 P.2d 732, 735 (1975), rev'd in part, affd in part,
113 Ariz. 107,547 P.2d 6 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976) (citations omitted).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

90

[Vol. 5:75

activity is harmfu1. 80 The statute could not be justified as a valid
exercise of police power authorized for the preservation of morality,
as "[n]o substantial prospect of harm from consensual sodomy nor
any threat to public-as opposed to private-morality has been
shown."81 This view reflects a minority view of jurisdictions in the
United States. 82
3.

Equal Protection

The New York Court of Appeals also invalidated section 130.38
on the ground that it denied defendants equal protection 83 of the
law. 84 Section 130.38 discriminates on its face against unmarried
persons because it prohibits them from engaging in an activity which
results in no sanctions against married persons. As a result of this
unequal treatment, the court looked to whether, at a minimum, there
was "some ground of difference that rationally explain[ed] the differ
ent treatment accorded married and unmarried persons ..." under
80. 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N'y.S.2d at 953.
81. Id at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
82. Private, consensual sodomy is a criminal offense in a majority of states: ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1977) (married couples excluded); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13
1411, 13-1412 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977) (homosexual acts only); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3502 (West 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2002 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); !UN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505
(1981) (homosexual acts only); Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 34-35 (West 1970); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158,
750.338, 750.338(a)-(b) (1968) (homosexual, lesbian and heterosexual acts); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.293 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1981) (homosexual acts
only); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979) (homosexual acts only); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14
177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707
(1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (homosexual acts only); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 944.17 (West 1982).
The following states have decriminalized consensual sodomy: Alaska; California;
Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Maine; Nebraska;
New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Dakota; Ohio; Oregon; South Dakota;
Vermont; Washington; Wyoming. People V. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 476, 415 N.E.2d
936, 937, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (1980), urt. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), held N.Y. PE
NAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1975) unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490
Pa. 91,93-94,415 A.2d 47, 48-49 (1980), held 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon
1973) unconstitutional as violative of equal protection of the law. See infra note 134.
83. The equal protection attack was not made in Doe V. Commonwealth's Attorney,
hence, the equal protection attack on consensual sodomy statutes has yet to be ruled on
by the Supreme Court. See, Comment, supra note 5, at 586.
84. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
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the statute. 85
It was upon equal protection analysis that the court of appeals
rested its holding. Although the court decided that the state demon
strated no compelling interest sufficient to justify the infringement of
a fundamental right under due process, it left this holding open to
question and invalidated the statute through equal protection argu
ments in a manner similar to the Supreme Court's holding in
Eisensladl. 86
If we are correct in the view earlier expressed in this opinion that
section 130.38 of the Penal Law infringes on defendants' right of
privacy which is a fundamental right, then, as observed in Eisen
stadt, the statutory classification "would have to be not merely
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the .
achievement of a compelling state interest" . . . . As was so in Ei
senstadt, however, we do not need to measure the statute by that
test inasmuch as it fails to satisfy even the more lenient rational
basis standard. 87

The court of appeals found that there was no evidence showing
that the classification created by section 130.38 achieved state goals
or was related to any articulated state justification. Section 130.38
did not protect the institution of marriage or rights accorded married
persons. 88 The statute was not shown to preserve or foster mar
riage. 89 No evidence was advanced to reveal that consensual sod
omy relates to rights accorded married persons. 90 As a result, the
court concluded that there was no rational basis for permitting mar
ried persons to engage in sodomitical behavior while forbidding un
married persons to do the same. 91 This conclusion echoed an earlier
rationale that "all [of] the arguments that have ever pertained to the
prohibition of 'deviate' forms of intercourse. . . have pertained irre
85. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 447. The Court of Appeals did not address the
"suspect classification" aspect of eq ual protection analysis. If the classification were sus
pect, then strict judicial scrutiny is required and the state must show that the legislation is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Analysis in this area is similar to the
scrutiny used in cases involving a fundamental right. See supra note 19. For a discussion
of homosexuals and their qualifications as a suspect class, see Note, supra note 20, at
1624-27. But see DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979)
(homosexuals are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
86. 405 U.S. at 438 (1972).
87. 51 N.Y.2d at 492 n.6, 415 N.E.2d at 942 n.6, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953 n.6 (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
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spective of the marital status of the participants."92
The Onofre majority stated that it utilized minimum scrutiny to
examine the explanation for the different treatment accorded mar
ried and unmarried persons. 93 The court of appeals, however, actu
ally used a form of heightened scrutiny in its analysis of section
130.38. True minimum scrutiny would mean that the court automat
ically should defer to a judgment of the legislature, as did the
Supreme Court in applying the minimum scrutiny standard of re
view to economic and social regulations. 94 Yet the court an~logized
its rationale to that used by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt and was
unwilling to defer to the legislative judgment. 9s
Eisenstadt indicated that the Supreme Court would be hesitant
to increase the number of fundamental rights and suspect classes in
the area of personal liberties and, hence, the Court utilized an inter
mediate level of scrutiny in an effort to look closely at the reasona
bleness of the connection between the classification and the purpose
of the statute. 96
92. People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 891, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1974) (there is no logical or factual reason for permitting the marital status ofpartici
pants to determine whether the mode of sexual conduct is legal or criminal), vacated, 97
Misc. 2d 905, 412 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Erie County Ct. 1975).
93. See supra text accompanying note 85.
94. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williams v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,. 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Lincoln Fed
eral Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
95. The justification for deference under minimum scrutiny analysis is the court's
unwillingness to substitute its own judgments for those of the legislature. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 520-21 (Black,
J., dissenting); Carpenters & Joiners Union Loca1213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 728
(1942).
96. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. I, 20-48 (1972).
A student note contends that while Gunther's model, which includes an alternative
to the traditional two tiers of the equal protection test, may offer greater protection for
private consensual sodomy, later Supreme Court cases do not support the intermediate
scrutiny model, most notably Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). Note,
supra note 20, at 1627 n.108.
More recent cases suggest, however, that Gunther's model has taken a firm hold in
the Ninth Circuit, which has interpreted recent Supreme Court decisions as favoring the
utilization of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Hatheway v. Secretary of
Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,454
U.S. 855 (1981).
Recent decisions indicate that substantive due process scrutiny of a government
regulation involves a case-by-case balancing of the nature of the individual in
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As in Eisenstadt, the Onofre majority refused simply to defer to
the legislative judgment. Unlike Eisenstadt, however, the Onofre
majority found it unnecessary to hypothesize a rational state pur
pose,97 as one already existed: the upholding of public morality.98
The court of appeals held:
[The prosecution] failed to demonstrate how government interfer
ence with the practice of personal choice in matters of intimate
sexual behavior out of view of the public and no commercial com
ponent will serve to advance the cause of public morality or do
anything other than restrict individual conduct and impose a con
cept of private morality chosen by the State. 99

Thus, even if it were assumed that the objectives tendered by the
prosecution 100 were matters of legitimate public concern, no rational
relationship was evidenced between upholding public morality and
terest allegedly infringed, the importance of the government interests furthered,
the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of the government entity respon
sible for the regulation to more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving
its goals.
Id at 807 (citation omitted). Cases supporting this balancing test, also known as inter
mediate scrutiny, are Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur
ring) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring»;
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion).
The dissent in Miller v. Rumsfeld strenuously argued against such an interpretation
of these cases, as it contended that the court attempted to justify its utilization of the
intermediate scrutiny approach in an effort to avoid a discussion of petitioner's funda
mental right of privacy and thus, hold against petitioner under a lesser standard of scru
tiny. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 80-83 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), cerro
denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
This is contrasted with the situation in Onofre, where the majority, in refusing to
defer to the legislative goal of upholding public morality, balanced the state's interest
with the interest of the individual and as a result, used intermediate scrutiny to find for
respondents.
97. The Supreme Court in Eisenstadt determined for itself the legislative purposes
and then concluded that the statutory means were not related to the legislative purposes.
The three possible purposes of the statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
were deterrence of premarital sex, protection of community health through regulation of
harmful articles, and limitation of the use of contraceptives. 405 U.S. at 442-43. The
Court found these purposes either marginally or completely unrelated to the distinction
between married and unmarried persons. Id at 445-49.
98. That the enactment of section 130.38 of the Penal Law was prompted by
something other than fear for the physical safety of participants in consensual
sodomy is suggested by . . . the chaIrman of the Temporary Commission [on
Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code]: 'It would appear that the Leg
islature's decision to restore the consensual sodomy offense was, as with adul
tery, based largely upon the premises that deletion thereof might ostensibly be
construed as legislatIve approval of deviate conduct.'
51 N.Y.2d at 489,415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 (citation omitted).
99. Id at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
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the classifications created by section 130.38. As a result, the statute
fell as it violated the right of equal protection purportedly enjoyed
by persons who are unmarried. lol An argument can be made that if
the court of appeals were to have used a true minimum scrutiny
standard of review,102 the statute prohibiting unmarried individuals'
private, consensual sodomitical activities should have been up
held. lo3 Such an argument can be made as there is at least slight
merit to the legislature's contention that proscription of consensual
sodomy among unmarried adults will help to uphold public moral
ity.l04 At this point, the question becomes whether the regulation of
morality is a matter for legitimate legislative concern.

III.

QUESTIONS OF MORALITY

Regardless of the type of analysis, be it due process or equal
protection, and regardless of the level of scrutiny, be it strict, inter
mediate, or minimum, the Onofre majority believed that unmarried,
consenting adults in private settings should not be subject to criminal
sanctions for acts of sodomy. lOS The ultimate question posed by
Onofre is whether a state may regulate consensual sodomy purely
for the purpose of safeguarding the moral interest of its citizens and
to what extent a legislature or court may choose and enforce a moral
viewpoint. 106
Justice Gabrielli argued in Onofre that the majority's reasoning
was similar to the discredited doctrine of substantive economic due
process. 107 His dissent claimed that the majority used its own no
tions of justice to override a penal statute enacted by the legislature
as an expression of society'S view as to what constitutes morally ac
101. 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 942-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
102. See supra text accompanying note 94.
103. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, c.J., dissenting)
("[t)here is a right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society. . . .");
Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 384, 430 A.2d 570, 580 (1981) (one valid objective of a
perverted practices or sodomy statute is the protection of public morality).
104. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
105. The Court of Appeals expressed no view, however, as to any theological,
moral, or psychological evaluation of consensual sodomy, nor was it unaware of the sen
sibilities of those who believe that consensual sodomy is evil and should be prohibited.
51 N.Y.2d at 488 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3.
106. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interstate commerce power may be
used to defeat purposes that are deemed to be immoral. E.g., United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973) (transportation of obscene material for private use). See also, Comment,
supra note 5, at 580.
107. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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ceptable behavior. 108 Therefore, the controversial issue that re
mained was the nature of morally acceptable behavior. Although
Justice Gabrielli accused the Onofre majority of implementing its
own notions of morality, his traditional view of morality,109 also
based on an interpretation of Supreme Court decisions, is open to
the same attack. I 10 The Supreme Court, in determinations of funda
mental rights and suspect classes, has drawn the criticism that it en
gages in substantive due process analysis. l l l .Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney 112 represents this criticism. l13
We cannot know whether the Court believed no privacy right ex
isted at all, or whether one existed but was far outweighed by
some government interest. But we can certainly wonder what dis
tinguishes a heterosexual's privacy interest in marriage, procrea
tion, contraception, abortion, and child-rearing-all protected by
the Constitution-from a homosexual's privacy interest in having
sexual relations. I 14
Perhaps all that we know about .Doe is that it symbolizes judicial
recognition of government regulation of private, consensual sexual
conduct,ll5 a view purported by the Onofre dissent. While Justice
Gabrielli contended that this view is of greater intrinsic merit than
the majority's notions of morality, he did not articulate why the .Doe
view is of greater validity than the view of the Onofre majority.
One critic of .Doe contends that the Supreme Court "may have
summarily limited the right of privacy in a way that suggests fiat, not
articulated principle."116 This fiat, the view that homosexual con
duct is not constitutionally protected, is justified by proponents who
reason that condemnation of certain sexual practices can be traced to
portions of the Bible. 117 Yet portions of the Bible indicating that
108. 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
109. See supra notes 37-40; infra notes 124-26.
110. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 587, 615 (1977) (citing Ely, The
Wages o[ Crying Wort A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973».
111. Baze\on,supra note 110, at 616.
112. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge Ct.), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1967).
113. Bazelon, supra note 110, at 616.
114. Id
115. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 599.
116. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right o[ Privacy: A Moral
Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1977). Richards' article discusses whether the
Supreme Court's view is fundamentally consistent with the moral theory underlying the
right to privacy. Id at 1286- 1321. See supra note 64.
117. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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homosexual practices must be equated with lack of good moral char
acter, "like many other parts of the Holy Book, require interpreta
tion and ... even eminent theologians have not construed them as
condemning all homosexuality." 118
The dissent in Onofre maintained the view, however, that
sodomitical practices between consenting unmarried adults could be
proscribed and that the state could regulate moral behavior. Justice
Gabrielli accused the majority of extending Stanley to represent the
proposition that one is entitled to do anything in one's home as long
as it does not result in harm or jeopardize the well-being of others. I 19
The dissent reasoned that the holding in Shepard l20 should be dis
positive of the issue in Onofre: "I cannot agree ... that the right of
an individual to select his own form of sexual gratification should
stand on any better footing than does the right of an individual to
choose his own brand of intoxicant without governmental inter
ference."121
The divergence of opinions in Onofre reflected the debate of
Lord Devlin l22 and H.L.A. Hart l23 that stemmed from the Wolfenden
Report .124 Devlin believed that society has a general right to substi
tute its moral judgment for that of the individual, even at the ex
pense of personal liberty. 125 Devlin opposed the Wolfenden Report,
urging that "the suppression of vice is the law's business because a
violation 9f the society's moral structure undermines the very basis
118. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (petition for naturaliza
tion granted to homosexual).
119. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5, at 586. Gabrielli acknowledged that the
legislature may not exercise power in a manner that would impair a fundamental right,
yet he argued that "it begs the question to suggest, as the majority has, that such a right is
necessarily involved whenever the State seeks to regulate conduct pursuant only to its
interest in the moral well-being of its citizenry." 51 N.Y.2d at 497, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
120. 50 N.Y.2d at 640,409 N.E.2d at 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 363. See supra notes 76
77 and accompanying text.
121. 51 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 415 N.E.2d at 946, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
122. See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
123. See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
124. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT (1963). The report proposed the decriminalization of homo
sexuality, as the function of criminal law "is to preserve public order and decency." THE
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra, at 23. The report maintained that "there must remain a
realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private immorality." Id at 48.
125. See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986,
987 (1966).
.
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of that society."126 Hart, in contrast, supported the Wolfenden Re
port, finding it "difficult to understand the assertion that conformity
... is a value worth pu:rsuing . . ."127 and he "accepted the regula
tion of private conduct only so far as necessary to prevent harm to
others." 128
The Onofre majority, like Hart, advocated personal autonomy,
while the dissent, in the spirit of Devlin, held that society's view of
morality is the view with which the individual must abide. 129 Doe
also revealed this split in philosophical thought. Although the Doe
majority found that homosexual behavior was not constitutionally
protected, the dissent argued that every individual has the right to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion into one's decisions re
lated to private matters of intimate concern. 130 A number of recent
cases also reflect this debate. 131 Although they" vary in their fact pat
terns,132 each case addressed the question of whether an individual
has a fundamental right of privacy with respect to private, consen
sual acts of sodomy. 133 The debate spurred by Devlin and Hart con
tinues, perhaps best reflected by the contrast between Onofre and
Doe.
Delineation and illumination of the differing viewpoints, how
ever, does not resolve the question of which viewpoint is correct; nor
does it provide an answer to the question of how such a viewpoint
might be applied. 134
126. Note, GONZ. L. REV. 575, 576 (1977). See P. DEVLIN, supra note 122, at 25.
127. H.L.A. HART, supra note 123, at 57.
128. Note, supra note 126, at 577.
129. Post Griswold cases cause one to speculate as to whether the courts' refusal to
extend constitutional privacy protection to nonmarried persons really stems from percep
tions of rational basis or compelling state interests, or whether the refusal actually stems
from perceptions of moral propriety. Eichbaum, Lovisi v. Slayton: Constitutional Privacy
and Sexual Expression, 10 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 525, 533 (1978-79).
130. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
131. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting), eert. denied,
454 U.S. 855 (1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. de
nied, 102 S. Ct. 324 (1981); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g en
bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981); Neville v. State, 290
Md. 364, 430 A.2d 570 (1981); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980).
132. See supra notes 34, 48 for an explanation of the respective fact patterns.
133. Id
134. The Onofre majority, willing to extend a fundamental right to private consen
sual acts of sodomy, and unwilling to defer to a legislative goal of upholding the public
morality, claimed that it was "not plowing new grounds" in the area. 51 N.Y.2d at 492,
415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953. To support this contention, the court cited State
v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (no compelling state interest sufficient to justify
intrusion by an Iowa statute prohibiting acts of sodomy between consenting, unmarried
adults of the opposite sex); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (fornica
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Were the Court actually to undertake the task of judging the ra
tionality of sodomy legislation, selecting standards could prove
most difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it may be doubted that a
purely ethical justification-where no harm to the safety or mental
well-being of the actors or others is involved--<:an be demon
strated by the logic and proof inherent in reasonableness and
rationality. 135
This quotation concludes with an example of frustrating logic: "The
impossibility of showing that sodomy legislation safeguards morality
would be ground enough for holding it irrational and void. On the
other hand, if the moral harm produced by acts of sodomy cannot be
demonstrated, neither can it be proved that sodomitical conduct
causes no such harm."136 Such logic also reveals the futility of an
attempt to resolve the philosophical conflict in Onofre.
Wilkinson and White,137 however, suggest that a tangible com
pelling state interest exists to justify state regulation of purely moral
interests, one not raised in Onofre: the state's interest in the prohibi
tion of homosexuality. 138 They contend that the state has a legiti
mate interest in discouraging public behavior that gives widespread
offense, and that homosexual behavior as well as heterosexual be
havior involves public conduct. 139 Their concession to the argument
that the public would adjust to displays of homosexual behavior
leads them to another compelling state justification: "The most
threatening aspect of homosexuality is its potential to become a via
ble alternative to heterosexual intimacy."I40
Yet even if the assumption were made that the state's interest in
the prohibition of homosexual behavior was compelling and that
consensual sodomy statutes were a necessary means of discouraging
such behavior, the issue of whether consensual sodomy could be pro
tion statute ruled unconstitutional as it regulates private morality; such conduct cannot
be inhibited through criminal sanctions); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415
A.2d 47 (1980) (oral sodomy statute struck down on equal protection grounds as it ex
cluded on its face persons married to each other).
135. Comment, supra note 5, at 584.
136. Id. at 585.
137. Wilkinson & White, supra note 5.
138. Id. at 593. The term "unmarried adult" necessarily includes unmarried ho
mosexual adults.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 595. BUI see In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which
the court reasoned that the public's complacency with regard to private homosexual con
duct, reflected in sparing enforcement of laws proscribing homosexual activity, is justifi
cation enough to hold that the law does not specifically extend to consensual sodomy in
private. Id. at 928-29.
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scribed between heterosexuals on purely moral justifications would
remain. 141 Without attempting to supply an answer to this question,
the New York Court of Appeals has held that private, consensual
acts of sodomy between unmarried adults is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution and that a statute excluding married
persons from the prohibition violates the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of equal protection under the law.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari review to Onofre does
little to clarify the extent to which unmarried adults may engage in
private, sodomitical consensual sexual acts. The New York Court of
Appeals has relied on a broad interpretation of Griswold and its
progeny,142 which cannot be reconciled with the narrow view of the
fundamental right of privacy related to marriage and childbearing
that may be discerned from the same cases. The court of appeals has
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has the power of final dispo
sition of the matter. 143 Until the Supreme Court acts on this aspect
of the fundamental right of privacy, the court of appeals' decision in
Onofre can be viewed as a sound decision which rests on equal pro
tection analysis similar to that utilized by the Supreme Court in
Eisenstadt .144
Eisenstadt, and its elimination of the distinction between mar
ried and unmarried persons, if understood to extend sexual freedom
in private to consenting adults,145 necessarily extended this freedom
to private homosexual acts. Onofre adopted the more expansive
view of Eisenstadt and reflected society'S changing attitudes toward
sexual conduct. 146 Onofre also exemplified the philosophy advo
cated by H.L.A. Hart which supports freedom of the individual.
Doe, however, was in accord with the narrow interpretation of
141. Some authority indicates that heterosexual deviate sexual conduct would be
acceptable. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), qffd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa
1976); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 377, 430 A.2d 570, 576 (1981) (dictum), State v.
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 214, 381 A.2d 333, 339-40 (1977). But see, State v. Callaway, 25
Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975), rev'd sub nom., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107,547
P.2d 6 (1976) (en banc), em. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976); State v. Elliot, 89 N.M. 305, 551
P.2d 1352 (1976).
142. See supra text accompanying note 68.
143. See supra text accompanying note 87.
144. 405 U.S. at 438.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36, 41-43.
146. Potter, Sex Offenses, 28 ME. L. REV. 65, 90 (1976).

100

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:75

Eisenstadt which would allow a right of personal privacy in sexual
activities related to the birth of children. 147 This suggests that the
state has an interest in regulating private sexual behavior, especially
in cases involving homosexual behavior. Doe, contrary to Onofre,
reflected the philosophical view supported by Lord Devlin, which
holds that the individual must sacrifice some liberty for the overall
good of society.
Onofre and Doe represent two opposing theories on the applica
tion of moral doctrine. 148 Although the opposing philosophies ap
pear valid when examined separately, their existence has created a
dichotomy in case law which cannot be settled until the issue of ho
mosexuality is resolved. The compromise suggested by the concur
ring opinion in Onofre, 149 that moral judgments can be made by the
legislature so long as they are applied fairly,ISO is the most equitable
solution. The concurring opinion of Judge Jasen contended that a
moral judgment must app~y equally to all citizens. 151 This means
that in the area of consensual sodomy a choice between moral doc
trines would allow a legislature to adopt either: The view advocated
by Devlin, the Onofre dissent, and the Doe majority, which holds
that for the good of society all adults sacrifice their privilege to en
gage in private, consensual sodomy; or the view of moral doctrine
supported by Hart, the Onofre majority, and the Doe dissent, which
favors the freedom of the individual, specifically the right of an adult
to engage in private, consensual sodomy. Unfortunately, a simple
resolution of the opposing philosophies is prevented by the issue of
homosexuality. Homosexuality prevents the exclusive adoption of
either of these views. While Griswold extended the right of privacy
to the marital bedroom and Eisenstadt extended this right to unmar
ried persons, Doe suggested that the homosexual segment of the pop
ulation sacrifice its individual liberty for the moral good of society.
The ultimate choice becomes whether a particular moral view is
applied to all unmarried persons, or simply to a certain segment
the homosexual population. The broader issue is whether married
persons can be treated differently from unmarried persons with re
147. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
148. Compare the Doe majority, 403 F. Supp. at 1199 and the Onofre dissent, 51
N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 944,434 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), with the
Onofre majority, id. at 476, 415 N.E.2d at 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 947 and the Doe dissent,
403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
149. 51 N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954 (Jasen, J.,
concurring).
150. fd.
151. fd.
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spect to decisions pertaining to sodomitical acts. If sodomy were, in
fact, deviate or harmful, then a fair application of moral doctrine
would require that sodomy be proscribed for all citizens. If sodomy
were not found to be harmful to participants, that is, adults in pri
vate settings, then fair application of a moral doctrine would require
that all citizens be allowed to engage in consensual sodomy. Eisen
stadt stands for the proposition that married and unmarried persons
cannot be treated differently in terms of access to contrac,eptives. 152
The issue, and major point of contention in this note, is whether such
equal treatment is applicable to areas of sodomitical activity unre
lated to the birth of a child. The Onofre court extends this equal
treatment to intimate sodomitical behavior among consenting adults
in private settings and will leave the discouragement of homosexual
behavior to social institutions other than the New York Penal Code.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the Supreme Court to clarify this area of the law, it must
decide between the two underlying philosophiesl 53 embodied in
Onofre and Doe. The choice exists in both due process and equal
protection analysis, under either strict or minimum scrutiny. In a
due process analysis applying strict scrutiny, extension of a funda
mental right of privacy to secluded acts of consensual sodomy be
tween unmarried adults necessarily includes approval of private,
consensual homosexual acts.154 Restriction of the fundamental right
of privacy, however, infringes upon the right of unmarried adults to
engage in intimate personal decisions related to private sexual activi
ties. The Court's choice under equal protection analysis with strict
scrutiny is similar. The finding that unmarried persons are deprived
of a fundamental right entitles adult members of that group to in
dulge in private acts of consensual sodomy and necessarily includes
approval of private, consensual homosexual acts. Should it be found
that the classification does not interfere with a fundamental right,
however, the right of an unmarried adult to engage in intimate per
sonal decisions related to private sexual activities is severely
curtailed.
Under minimum scrutiny, the options also are mutually exclu
sive. Using this level of scrutiny, a court will decide whether, under
152. 405 U.S, at 438. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 116-29.
154. The term "unmarried" necessarily encompasses all homosexuals in the
United States, as our government does not sanction homosexual marriages.
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due process, it will defer to a legislative decree of the means by
which it attempts to achieve morally acceptable behavior. Under
equal protection, a court will decide whether to defer to a legislative
classification which may only slightly further a state's goal of up
holding a high standard of public morals. In deferring to the legisla
ture, the court restricts the rights of unmarried, consenting adults to
engage in specified forms of sexual gratification. Yet in finding no
rational connection between state purposes and means or classifica
tions employed, that is, not deferring, the court allows homosexual
as well as heterosexual, consensual, private sexual acts. In allowing
these acts, the court may not be applying a minimum scrutiny test.
The Court's options under both strict and minimum scrutiny il
lustrate the fallacy of the concurring opinion in Onofre, which rea
sons that morality may be enforced by the legislature, through the
courts, so long as the legislative judgment is applied fairly and
equally.155 The Supreme Court, in ultimately choosing one option
over the other, must adopt a particular moral point of view. 156 Yet
the choice of a particular view in the area of private, consensual sex
ual activities among adults necessarily excludes the other point of
view and necessarily infringes upon those whose beliefs and lifes
tyles do not conform to the Court's chosen morality. For a moral
judgment to be applied fairly, the Court either must allow all indi
viduals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy or it must declare
that such acts are proscribed for all persons. The former view in
cludes acceptance of homosexual behavior, while the latter view
would rescind a right already given to some members of society.
The Court, however, must consider cautiously its role in this
regard, for in invalidating a consensual sodomy statute on equal pro
tection grounds, it leaves a state legislature with little choice but to
draft a statute punishing all consensual sodomy or to allow such be
havior to go unpunished. The compromise, punishment of only con
sensual, private homosexual acts as in Doe, is not a fair application
of a moral judgment to all citizens.
Douglas Everett Schwartz

155. 51 N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954 (Jasen, J.,
concurring).
156. See supra notes 106-39 and a~mpanying text.

